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Abstract 
Aaron Ridley has recently attacked the study of musical ontology – an apparently fertile 
area in the philosophy of music. I argue here that Ridley’s arguments are unsound. There 
are genuinely puzzling ontological questions about music, many of which are closely 
related to questions of musical value. While it is true that musical ontology must be 
descriptive of pre-existing musical practices and that some debates, such as that over the 
creatability of musical works, have little consequence for questions of musical value, 
none of this implies that these debates themselves are without value. 
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For it is pointless to affect indifference with respect to such [metaphysical] 
inquiries, to whose object human nature cannot be indifferent. Moreover, 
however much they may think to make themselves unrecognizable by exchanging 
the language of the schools for a popular style, these so-called indifferentists, to 
the extent that they think anything at all, always unavoidably fall back into 
metaphysical assertions, which they yet professed so much to despise.1 
 
In a recent article, Aaron Ridley, a notable philosopher of music, attacks the study of 
musical ontology.2 His conclusions range in strength from the claim that musical 
ontology is ‘absolutely worthless’ (203) to the suggestion that ‘in musical aesthetics, 
ontology comes last (at the end of time, perhaps)’ (215). As someone who works in the 
field of musical ontology, these claims strike me as wrong. I feel some obligation, then, 
to defend the practice of musical ontology – of trying to describe the kinds of musical 
things there are, and the relations that hold between them. I think the best way to be 
convinced of the value of musical ontology is to read some. To that end, all I can do here 
is direct readers elsewhere. But I will also dispatch Ridley’s negative arguments and say 
something about the benefits and limits of musical ontology. 
I. CONTRA RIDLEY 
Ridley’s strategy is as follows. He first argues that musical ontology has no consequences 
for musical aesthetics or practice, and that no one is in fact, or should be, puzzled by 
questions of musical ontology. (By ‘musical aesthetics’ he seems to mean the study of 
questions of musical value.) From this he concludes that no one should engage in debate 
over questions of musical ontology. He then argues, contrary to musical ontologists’ 
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claims that answering questions of value requires an ontological theory, or at least 
ontological assumptions, that in fact the reverse holds: the ontological facts about music 
depend on facts about its value. Thus the ontologist cannot defend herself by claiming 
only to be doing musical metaphysics, divorcing her inquiry from questions of value. 
I will argue against each of Ridley’s claims, in reverse order. First, I will show 
that Ridley’s main argument about the relationship between musical ontology and value 
fails, since it equivocates on the notion of the ‘content’ of a musical work. Second, I will 
show that his subsidiary argument – that musical ontology is not worth doing since 
genuine ontological questions never arise in musical practice or aesthetics – does not 
succeed, and that Ridley fails even to keep controversial ontological assumptions out of 
his own article. Third, I will show how the ontology of music can have important 
consequences for questions of musical value, though a much more concrete case is made 
for this conclusion by actual studies in musical ontology than by my abstract arguments 
here.  
1.1 Ontology and content 
Ridley’s argument against doing musical ontology independently of, or even prior to, 
musical value theory is the following.  
[A] performance of a work cannot be ‘faithful’ to it unless it evinces an 
understanding of it. And if a performance’s faithfulness is, minimally, a matter of 
the understanding it shows, then a performance is, in that much, to be valued in 
proportion to the richness, depth, insight, subtlety and so on of the understanding 
it evinces. But if this is right, evidently enough, much of the ‘content’ of a given 
work is only revealed in the understandings that faithful performances of it 
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evince. And that means that any attempt to specify that content – the content to 
which a good performance is faithful – in advance of evaluative judgements about 
particular performances of it, or independently of such judgments, must be futile 
and self-defeating.     (213) 
(Note that by ‘faithful’, Ridley seems to mean ‘good’, or ‘valuable’, since according to 
ordinary usage, but not Ridley’s, one can produce a performance that is faithful to a 
work, without its being revelatory, or even particularly interesting.) 
The first thing that calls for comment in this passage is Ridley’s apparent 
misconception of what it is that musical ontologists do. When he says that much of a 
given work’s content is revealed only in performances of it, this is supposed to be a 
rebuke to the musical ontologist. But I cannot think of a musical ontologist who would 
claim that his or her theory can tell you what the content of a particular work is. Musical 
ontologists theorize about the kinds of musical things there are – works, scores, 
performances, recordings – and the relations between them. Musicologists (broadly 
construed), on the other hand, talk about particular works, performances, scores, and so 
on.3 To give a concrete example, Stephen Davies, in an important recent book on musical 
ontology, essays a theory about the relation between a work and a performance of it. He 
argues that three necessary conditions jointly suffice for a performance’s being of a 
particular work: ‘(1) the performance matches the work’s content, more or less; (2) the 
performers intend to follow most of the instructions specifying the work, whoever wrote 
them; and (3) a robust causal chain runs from the performance to the work’s creation’. 4 
In a later article on profundity in instrumental music, Davies puts on his musicologist’s 
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hat to give an analysis of the first movement of Bartók’s Music for Strings, Percussion, 
and Celesta. The analysis ends with the following paragraph: 
Here is the miracle. The closing three measures not only draw the movement to its 
close, they recapitulate and thereby summarize the whole movement’s structure. 
The two voices move in contrary motion from A, settle simultaneously on E-flat, 
the tritone, and then reverse the process until they converge in unison on the final 
A.5 
You might wonder how on earth Davies derives these details about Bartók’s piece from 
his account of the relation between work and performance, quoted above. But I suspect 
that you don’t. Clearly, an account of the kind of thing a musical work is will not tell you 
anything about the content of a particular work or performance. For those details, you 
must examine the work in question; but then you are engaged in musicology, not musical 
ontology. 
 Comparing music with literature helps to point up the problem with Ridley’s talk 
of the ‘content’ of a musical work. In one sense of ‘content’ – equivalent to what usually 
goes by the name of ‘meaning’ in literary discourse – it is plausible that we couldn’t hope 
to say what the content of a work is, in advance of ‘faithful’ (good) interpretations of it. 
(It does not follow that the work does not have that content in advance of those 
interpretations, but I ignore this issue here.) In another sense of content, though – that 
which we would use to check whether we had a faithful copy of the text (in the ordinary 
sense of ‘faithful’) – clearly we could know the content of the work in advance of any 
interpretations of it. Given enough time, I could tell you whether you have a faithful copy 
of Finnegans Wake, though I have next to no understanding of that work.6 
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 Once we have sorted out these senses of content, we can read Ridley’s argument 
in two ways. The charitable reading is to use the deep sense of content, or meaning, in 
which case the conclusion is that any attempt to specify the content of a work in advance 
of a good interpretation of it would be futile. I say ‘good interpretation’ rather than 
‘faithful performance’ because (i) as noted above, Ridley uses ‘faithful’ in a non-standard 
way, and (ii) he includes among performances those ‘in one’s head’, which makes his 
denial of the possibility of achieving an understanding of a work in advance of hearing a 
performance of it more plausible.7 On this reading, Ridley’s argument seems defensible, 
if trivial. The drawback is that on this reading the argument fails to connect with Ridley’s 
main concerns in his article, for ‘content’, in the sense being used, is not the kind of thing 
musical ontologists describe. In order to reach the strong conclusion about musical 
ontology Ridley is aiming for, we must read ‘faithful performance’ more literally, and 
give ‘content’ its shallower meaning of just what would determine whether or not we 
have a performance of the work. But on this reading, the argument is indefensible, for the 
reasons given above – anyone with access to a copy of the score and the ability to read it 
can tell you to a large extent the content a performance would need to have were it to be a 
performance of this work.8 
 1.2 Aesthetics without ontology? 
A second argument Ridley employs is that we are never genuinely confused or puzzled 
about the ontology of the music we listen to, so there is no point in theorizing about it. 
This sounds extremely odd coming from a philosopher. Whoever ‘we’ is supposed to 
refer to here, it must exclude musical ontologists, since they will certainly claim to be 
puzzled, and perhaps even confused, about the ontology of the music they are listening 
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to. Consider, for comparison, the plausible claim that ‘we’ are never genuinely confused 
or puzzled about whether we know anything, or whether other people have experiences 
like we do, or whether I’m the same person who went to sleep in my bed last night. These 
claims don’t carry much weight with epistemologists, philosophers of mind, or 
metaphysicians. Yet Ridley is arguing that musical ontologists should be silenced on the 
basis of such considerations. As I see it, no one should be forced to consider these 
questions (introductory philosophy courses notwithstanding), but neither should anyone 
be compelled not to consider them. A reasonable response to this defence might be that 
epistemologists et al. are able to show quickly that there are no obvious answers in their 
fields of inquiry, and thus that they are not (necessarily) wasting their time addressing the 
issues that interest them. Thus the musical ontologist is at least beholden to show 
likewise that questions of musical ontology are not easy to answer. Ridley wisely does 
not parlay this response, nor does he attempt to provide the easy answers to any music-
ontological questions.9 Rather, he claims that 
I have not [committed myself to a whole set of ontological claims throughout the 
course of my own argument]10.…All I have argued is that performances can show 
us things about works; and that requires nothing more than the thought that 
(some) performances are interpretations of works – not, I surmise, a proposition 
likely to provoke a storm of protest, and certainly not one that presupposes (or 
should prompt) the slightest flicker of ontological reflection.…At most, I have 
helped myself to some perfectly neutral, pre-theoretical thoughts. And these are of 
a sort that no one, whatever their ontological views, could possibly object to….     
(219) 
 8 
The idea is that we can do all of musical aesthetics in this ontologically neutral mode. 
 But, in fact, much of what Ridley says does imply some substantive ontological 
presuppositions, and certainly prompts ontological reflection in those predisposed to such 
reflection. Showing this will be enough to put musical ontology on a par with the other 
philosophical inquiries mentioned above. 
 One example of Ridley’s not-so-neutral ontological assumptions follows his 
discussion of Davies’s proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for a performance’s 
being of a given work, quoted above. Ridley says that 
if, as I have argued, a revelatory performance is one that is faithful to a work in a 
way that necessarily defies specification in advance, then, first, as a performance 
that is faithful to the work it is, trivially, of it, and second, amongst its 
unforeseeable qualities may well be the disregard of any, or even of all, of the 
independently specifiable bits of ‘content’ that it was supposed, as a legitimate 
performance, to have to match.     (214) 
Is any performance that reveals something about a work trivially a performance of it? 
Performances of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony have revealed things to me about 
Berlioz’s Symphonie Fantastique. But I would not agree that the former were 
performances of the latter. Is Ridley truly making the trivial claim, then, that any 
authentic, or faithful, or true, performance of a work is a performance of that work? His 
second claim belies this reading. It is that such a performance need not include any of the 
instruments, pitches, tonal structure, etc., that many theorists argue are constitutive of 
such works. But without further explanation (which Ridley does not provide), this means 
that a performance apparently of the Symphonie Fantastique may well in fact be a 
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performance of Beethoven’s Ninth. This conclusion seems just the sort of ‘wildly 
implausible’ claim that Ridley (203) accuses Nelson Goodman of making in Languages 
of Art,11 thereby kicking off the unhealthy obsession with ontology that philosophers of 
music now supposedly suffer from. I am certainly prompted to wonder on quite what 
grounds Ridley would claim that a certain performance is or is not of a particular work. 
Whatever they are, they are clearly not neutral, pre-theoretical assumptions that no 
ontologist could possibly object to. 
 1.3 Ontology and value 
Thus far I have shown that Ridley’s two main arguments for the thesis that we should 
abandon musical ontology are unsound. We need not rely on value judgments about a 
particular performance to determine whether or not it is a performance of a particular 
work, nor is it the case that questions of musical ontology do not arise for a 
philosophically-minded person interested in music. Moreover, Ridley himself has failed 
to write his article using only neutral, pre-theoretical assumptions about musical 
ontology. Perhaps Ridley’s negative arguments can be strengthened, but rather than 
attempt that here, I prefer to provide a positive argument for the relevance of ontological 
considerations to judgments of musical value. If musical value judgments presuppose 
ontological judgments, then Ridley’s arguments must fail. 
 Ridley asks, ‘How, exactly, is a convincing ontological backdrop supposed to 
lend perspicuity to evaluative questions? No one, so far as I am aware, has actually asked 
this: certainly no one has given any sort of explicit answer’ (210). Most philosophers of 
art take Kendall Walton to have asked this, and closely related questions, in ‘Categories 
of Art’.12 Walton also gives an explicit answer. The simplest way of explaining his 
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argument is through his fictional example of guernicas. A guernica is a particular kind of 
work of art in a particular alien tradition. 
Guernicas are like versions of Picasso’s ‘Guernica’ done in various bas-relief 
dimensions. All of them are surfaces with the colors and shapes of Picasso’s 
‘Guernica,’ but the surfaces are molded to protrude from the wall like relief maps 
of different kinds of terrain. Some guernicas have rolling surfaces, others are 
sharp and jagged, still others contain several relatively flat planes at various 
angles to each other, and so forth.13 
It so happens that sharp, jagged guernicas are dynamic and vital, expressive of anger, 
violence, and so on, while rolling guernicas are smooth, soft, and gentle.14 The shapes 
that we see in Picasso’s ‘Guernica’ do not play any more expressive or representational 
role in guernicas than the flatness of the canvas does in (our) paintings. Clearly, if 
someone who knew nothing about painting, but a lot about guernicas, saw Picasso’s 
‘Guernica’, they would (erroneously taking it to be a guernica) describe it as ‘cold, stark, 
lifeless, or serene and restful, or perhaps bland, dull, boring – but in any case not violent, 
dynamic, and vital’.15 The people from the alien culture would misdescribe Picasso’s 
work, because they would take it to be of a kind of which it is not. This sort of 
misdescription could easily result in a misevaluation. (Perhaps flat guernicas were all the 
rage in the ’60s, but everyone is just so over them now.) 
 Walton gives a parallel argument in a musical idiom in a later essay.16 Here, he 
asks us to imagine a Martian musical tradition. 
Martian scores do not indicate what pitches a performer is to play, or for what 
durations. Instead they give detailed instructions concerning dynamics, tempos, 
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articulations, vibrato, nuances of accent and timbre, etc. – instructions that are 
much more detailed than those provided by (traditional) scores in our society. The 
performer of a Martian work is free to decide what pitches to play and for what 
durations, but he is expected to play them with the dynamics, articulations, 
timbres, etc., indicated by the composer. Different performers playing from the 
same score will of course play different pitches and rhythms (and hence different 
harmonies and harmonic rhythms) in executing the composer’s instructions, just 
as on Earth different performers play the notes…specified by the composer with 
different dynamics, tempos, and articulations.17 
You can see where this is going. You might end up with a performance of a Martian work 
that sounds to us exactly like a performance of Beethoven’s Sixth Symphony. A 
classical-music lover will not be in a position to judge the performance as the thing that it 
is, namely, a performance of Marthoven’s Sixth. 
 Ridley might claim that that these fanciful examples are of little interest, since we 
never actually encounter such problems. We operate, he claims, with ‘an apparently 
rather robust sense of work identity’ (207). He considers purportedly difficult borderline 
cases and first performances of works, but argues that these never in fact present us with 
real ontological questions or confusion. But if our sense of work identity is so robust that 
it doesn’t present us with any problems, why is it that philosophers of music over the past 
forty years have been unable to reach a consensus as to what that sense is? Why doesn’t 
Ridley simply say what this sense is, if he wants to end ontological speculation? Clearly 
we do have some shared sense of work identity, otherwise we would not be able to begin 
to do musical ontology. But it seems equally clear that this sense is not a fully worked-
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out or robust one, otherwise there would be no ontological confusion, or disagreements 
between musical ontologists.18 Moreover, as I argued above, the fact, if it were one, that 
we are not presented with actual hard cases in our everyday musical activities would not 
show that musical ontology is worthless, any more than the fact that we are not regularly 
presented with purported time-travel machines shows that the possibility of time travel 
should not be pursued as a metaphysical question. Most importantly, though, we are in 
fact presented with hard cases and cases of confusion relatively commonly (that is, much 
more commonly than we are presented with purported time machines, or the 
transmigration of princes’ souls into cobblers’ bodies). Real examples are available. 
II. SOME BENEFITS OF DOING MUSICAL ONTOLOGY 
Cases of ontological confusion are difficult to find in the Western classical tradition, 
partly because the tradition is such an old one, so that there is, as Ridley points out, a 
relatively widely shared sense of what a work is, and what counts as a performance of 
one. This makes it less likely that people will disagree about a particular case, or that 
practitioners or outsiders will flout, or be unaware of, the conventions – some of the 
circumstances that result in hard cases. Similarly, because of the culturally entrenched 
view of classical music as superior, it is difficult to find criticisms of the entire tradition 
that are arguably rooted in ontological misunderstandings, as opposed to similar 
criticisms of ‘popular’ traditions, such as rock and jazz.19 
 Nevertheless, real cases of ontological confusion or disagreement can be found 
within the classical tradition.20 For convenience, I will take my examples from the very 
paper in which Ridley argues they do not exist. A favourite example of Ridley’s is 
‘muzak’d versions of the Ode to Joy theme’ (207 et passim). 
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One would not suffer as one does in elevators and supermarkets if the doubts 
[about whether one is hearing a performance of the Ode to Joy theme] were real. 
One would not be reduced to misanthropic cursings, to mutterings of ‘How could 
they? How dare they?’ if it really did strike one as a serious possibility that the 
miserable denatured pap oozing from the speakers was not the Beethoven after 
all. It clearly is the Beethoven, and that is why it makes one feel so low and 
vicious.     (207) 
It is notable that Ridley identifies as his target the theme from the Ode to Joy, rather than 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, or its fourth movement, or a section of that movement. 
For surely there would be disagreement about a claim that the recording he hears in the 
supermarket is a performance of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. But if it is Beethoven 
Ridley is listening to, why the anger? Apparently because it is such a bad performance. 
But would such rage result from even the most appalling imaginable live performance of 
the symphony by a full orchestra? I suspect not. Part of the reason for this is that the Ode 
to Joy theme is quite unremarkable.21 It is a commonplace in analyses of the Ninth 
Symphony that the theme that emerges low in the strings, early in the final movement, 
from the detritus of the preceding three movements, seems far too slight to bear the 
weight of this great symphony to its conclusion. One of the remarkable things about the 
work is that Beethoven shows these appearances to be deceiving. The greatness of the 
Ninth (or even its fourth movement) was surely not simply lying in wait in the Ode to Joy 
theme, to be discovered by any nineteenth-century composer with a reasonable grasp of 
harmony, counterpoint, and orchestration. Thus, part of what explains Ridley’s despair at 
the muzak’d Ode is that it untimely rips the theme from the context that makes it part of 
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something great.22 No one versed in classical music can keep Beethoven’s symphony out 
of his mind on hearing the Ode to Joy theme, and the inevitable comparison between 
Beethoven’s symphony and the piece of Muzak is bound to find the Muzak wanting. The 
moral outrage Ridley expresses (‘How could they? How dare they?’) is in part explained 
by the fact that we take works, not parts thereof (such as the Ode theme), as the primary 
products of artists. Perhaps there is no ontological confusion in Ridley’s account of his 
encounter with the muzak’d Ode. But the above analysis shows that his account certainly 
raises ontological questions that help to bring the issues he is concerned with into focus. 
 Another group of ontological issues is raised by some ground-clearing Ridley 
does early on in his article. He notes that he will use the term ‘performance’ broadly: ‘By 
“performance” I will mean not only the playing of a musical work by an individual or 
group before an audience, but also recordings, transcriptions, arrangements, versions and, 
in general, renditions of every sort’ (206). This seems a reasonably homogeneous set of 
things to bring under one term, and whether Ridley chooses ‘performance’ as his term is 
more or less a verbal issue, provided he does not equivocate on it. But it does simply 
sweep many ontological questions under the mat. For instance, Ridley is careful to say 
that the Muzak recording he hears in the supermarket is a ‘version’ of the Ode to Joy 
theme, as noted above. Why not simply say it is a performance of Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony? I am not suggesting that that is the best way to characterize it, but it certainly 
accords with Ridley’s terminology, and his choice not to use the term he has just defined 
in the previous paragraph reveals, I think, that there are interesting questions to be asked 
about when something is or is not a performance of something else. 
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 A second issue raised by his stipulative use of ‘performance’ is the question of 
whether recordings are in fact best characterized as performances of works. I have argued 
elsewhere that typical recordings in the Western classical tradition are best characterized 
as giving access to performances, on a par with attendance at a live performance,23 but 
there are people who disagree. Some think, for instance, that almost all sound recordings 
are works of art in their own right.24 It is easy to see the relationship between these 
disputes and evaluative issues. If the high Cs you hear on a recording of Tristan und 
Isolde are not in fact sung by Kirsten Flagstad, but by Elisabeth Schwarzkopf, while 
Flagstad sings all of Isolde’s other notes, and is alone listed as Isolde on the cover, is 
Flagstad (or someone else) cheating? She would be in a live performance, but if 
recordings are different kinds of works, standardly employing all manner of ‘studio 
trickery’, perhaps she is not.25 
There is another kind of case in which ontological confusion results in evaluative 
mistakes. There may develop two musical traditions that display many similarities, yet 
are ontologically quite different. The traditions may share roughly the same harmonic and 
melodic language, for instance, but one may be a tradition of live performances of 
enduring works, while another is centrally improvisatory. In such cases, it will be 
tempting to judge performances in the two traditions on the same grounds, since the same 
kinds of descriptive musicological judgments may apply to performances in both 
traditions. But evaluative judgments will not follow automatically from such descriptions. 
It is difficult to write a good fugue, which is part of the reason why good fugues, and 
performances of them, are valued. But it is even more difficult to improvise a good fugue, 
and thus we tend to value equally good, but improvised, performances of fugues even 
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more highly than those of ‘pre-composed’ fugues. If someone does not recognize that a 
certain performance is improvised, but rather assumes that it is a performance of a 
composed work, she will tend to undervalue the performance. Thus, approaching an 
improvisatory tradition as if it were one of composed works will result in thoroughgoing 
misevaluation. 
 It is this sort of ontological confusion that ontologists of rock and jazz music are 
attempting to untangle.26 For instance, in my view, rock music is centrally an artform in 
which recordings are the works of art, unlike Western classical music, which is a tradition 
wherein works are for performance, while in jazz there are no works, only performances. 
There is no space here to defend these particular views, but it should be clear that if they 
are correct there will be implications for evaluative judgments of these kinds of music.27 
III. SOME LIMITS OF MUSICAL ONTOLOGY 
While I do not think Ridley’s arguments are sound, I do accept two theses about musical 
ontology that might be considered much milder versions of some of the claims he makes, 
though I accept them for somewhat different reasons. The distance between his claims 
and mine can be gauged from the fact that while his imply that musical ontology should 
be abandoned, mine merely describe some limits on musical ontology. 
 The first thesis can be seen as taking the hyperbole out of what for Ridley is a 
concession – that perhaps musical ontology can be done ‘at the end of time’ (215). One 
thing that most musical ontologists (and ontologists of art in general) accept is that, 
whatever the status of general metaphysics, musical (and art) ontology is descriptive.28 
This is less controversial in musical ontology than in general metaphysics because music 
is a human practice, and thus it is less controversial that the objects of inquiry in musical 
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ontology are dependent on human minds in some sense. Exactly what sense is a matter of 
debate, of course.  Nonetheless, it follows that the study of musical ontology must come 
after a musical practice is established. If this is not the end of time exactly, it is at least 
later than one might address other philosophical questions about music.29 
 A second thesis I subscribe to is a distant cousin of Ridley’s claim that ‘there is no 
obvious sense in which [a musical ontologist] is engaged in philosophical aesthetics at 
all. At best, and instead, one might be engaged in the metaphysics of music, and that is a 
very different activity’ (208). I would say rather that some kinds of ontological inquiry 
are more closely linked to questions of musical value than others. Of course, if my 
arguments above are sound, this will provide no reason for anyone to stop what they are 
doing – it is not hopeless to engage in musical ontology before you have figured out a 
theory of musical value, for instance. But I also disagree with Ridley about which 
ontological questions are most distant from matters of value. Ridley’s central example of 
a worthless ontological pursuit is the search for the necessary and sufficient conditions on 
a performance’s being of a particular work. However, even Ridley does not deny the 
commonplace among those familiar with Western classical music that accuracy, or 
faithfulness to the work, is one important factor in the evaluation of a performance. 
 A better example, I think, is the on-going debate over the fundamental 
metaphysical nature of musical works in themselves (as opposed to their relations to 
performances). The theories put forward on this issue in the twentieth century read like a 
survey of general metaphysics. There have been idealists,30 nominalists,31 event 
theorists,32 realists,33 and even the odd eliminativist.34 Recently, the consensus has 
favoured realism – the view that musical works are abstract objects – with the central 
 18 
dispute being whether or not such abstracta can be created.35 This debate, it seems to me, 
might be more fairly characterized as ‘musical metaphysics’ than the debate over the 
conditions on work performances that Ridley fixes upon, since it is independent of most, 
if not all, questions of musical value.36 Just as any solution to the problem of universals 
must make some sense of our claims that two cakes have the same shape, any solution to 
the question of the fundamental nature of a musical work must make some sense of our 
claims that two performances are of the same work. Thus, any evaluative questions that 
hang on the latter issue will not trickle down to the more fundamental metaphysical 
debate.37 
 Finally, it is worth mentioning again the growing interest in comparative 
ontology. Recent work on the ontology of rock, jazz, and non-Western music, like the 
debate over the conditions on a work performance, takes for granted that some sense can 
be made of repeatable musical objects. The debate is rather about the roles those objects 
play in the musical practice in question. Is a rock recording some sort of representation of 
a work-performance, like a classical recording, or is it a work of art in its own right? This 
sort of question is clearly related to questions of musical value in two ways. First, in 
order to answer the question, one must look at the musical practice involved, including 
evaluative practices. If recordings are given primacy of place in the rock tradition, then 
that is one reason in favour of considering them to be works. Second, as mentioned 
above, part of the motivation for addressing these issues in the first place is putative 
evaluative errors that have been made in part on the basis of a misunderstanding of the 
ontology of the music involved. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Aaron Ridley’s arguments that musical ontology is worthless are unsound. There are 
genuinely puzzling ontological questions about music, many of which are closely related 
to questions of musical value. While it is true that musical ontology must be descriptive 
of pre-existing musical practices and that some debates, such as that over the creatability 
of musical works, have little consequence for questions of musical value, none of this 
implies that these debates themselves are without value.38 
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